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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is case about notice. Contrary to the State's assertion, it is not a case about proving
notice as an element of crime, but about notice as it pertains to due process of law. In 2011,
Mr. Roth was released on a one day furlough. Although the furlough order specifically required
that the State serve Mr. Roth with a copy of the order, the evidence shows the order was never
served.

The order contained the only warning to Mr. Roth that failure to return from the

furlough could result in a felony escape charge. The district court dismissed Mr. Roth's case
after the jury found him guilty because the State's failure to serve him with the furlough order
deprived him of notice and due process of law and, as such, served the ends of justice. The
district court also dismissed the case because the State's failure to comply with a district court
order interferes with the effective administration of the court's business and was necessary to
impress upon the sheriff the importance of serving court orders and properly documenting such
service. Mr. Roth asserts that the district court's order dismissing his case was proper and the
dismissal should be affirmed on appeal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2011, Mr. Roth was in the Ada County Jail as the result of an allegation that he had
violated the terms of his probation. (R., p.43, State's Exs. 2-3.) At his probation violation
arraignment hearing, the district court allowed Mr. Roth a one day furlough to go to Boise State
University and try to change his grades. (Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1, 9: 18:40 - 9: 19: 15, 9:30:29
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- 9:30:53 1.) On December 22, 2011, Mr. Roth was released from the Ada County Jail. (State's
Ex. 3.) Presumably, he did not return as instructed. (State's Ex. 4.)
In November of 2017, Mr. Roth was arrested pursuant to a warrant. (State's Ex. 5.) He
was then changed with escape under LC. § 18-2505. (R., pp.27-28.) Prior to trial, counsel filed
several motions to dismiss noting that Mr. Roth's actions did not constitute escape as defined by
I.C. § 18-2505. (R., pp.42-47, 61-62, 79-85.) These motions were denied. (R., pp.55-60, 63-69,
93-99.)
The case proceeded to trial. The State presented the testimony of two witnesses: Deputy
Cory Brooks and Deputy D.J. Rupert. (Tr. 2 , p.57, L.12-p.89, L.3; p.99, L.19-p.105, L.5.) The
State also submitted five exhibits. (State's Exs. 1-5.) The State then rested. (Tr., p.108, L.1.)
Immediately thereafter, defense counsel made a motion for an Idaho Criminal Rule 29
judgment of acquittal based upon the State's failure to prove notice. (Tr., p.109, L.7 - p.110,
L.16.) The State argued that it had proven notice beyond a reasonable doubt. (Tr., p.110, L.18 p.112, L.7.) The district court issued its decision the next morning. (Tr., p.125, L.13 - p.130,
L.14.) The court found that notice was not required under the first clause of I.C. § 18-2505,
denied the motion, and removed the notice element from the jury instructions. (Tr., p.127, L.1 p.129, L.8.) However, the court expressed due process concerns related to notice and the service
of the furlough order. (Tr., p.128, L.9-18; p.129, L.8 - p.130, L.4.) The court then noted that it
may grant a motion for judgment of acquittal "in the interests of justice." (Tr., p.130, Ls.5-10.)
When the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel again renewed his motion for
Rule 29 relief.

(Tr., p.174, Ls.4-16.)

The motion was again denied.

1

(Tr., p.180, L.2-4.)

Citations to the Motion to Reconsider Exhibit 1 are to the time of the statement, as noted when
the exhibit is played using The Record Player.
2

Nonetheless, the district court continued to be concerned that the furlough order had not been
served. (Tr., p.179, Ls.8-17.)
A few days later, Mr. Roth filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a
motion to dismiss. (R., pp.166-173.) Mr. Roth asserted that he had not received adequate notice,
such lack of notice resulted in a violation of due process, and that the district court had no
authority to grant a furlough back in 2011. (R., pp.166-173.) The State opposed the motion.
(Tr. 8/9/18, p.5, Ls.18-20; p.6, L.12 - p.7, L.11.)
The district court issued an order denying the motion for judgment of acquittal and
granting the motion to dismiss. (R., pp.177-182.) The district court noted that order for furlough
specifically required that notice be provided to Mr. Roth and that notice was not provided.
(R., p.182.) The district court then held that the case must be dismissed in the interest of justice
and for the effective administration of court business. (R., p.182.)
Approximately a week later, the State filed a motion to reconsider. (R., pp.186-191.)
The State claimed that the case was dismissed without authority, that proof of notice was not
required, and that even if notice was "a relevant consideration for [the] Court" Mr. Roth received
the notice he was due. (R., pp.186-191.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.215-221.)
The State filed a Notice of Appeal timely from both the district court's Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.C.R. 48(a)(2) and the Order Denying State's
Motion to Reconsider. (R., pp.202-204.)

2

Citations to the transcript of the trial will be cited as "Tr." All other transcript citations will
also include the date of the court proceeding.
3

ISSUE3
Did the district court abuse its discretion by dismissing Mr. Roth's case due to the State's failure
to comply with a district court order?

3

The issue statement has been rephrased by the Respondent.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Dismissed Mr. Roth's Case Due To The State's Failure To Comply
With A District Court Order

A.

Introduction
The State has appealed from the district court's order dismissing Mr. Roth's case because

the State failed to provide Mr. Roth with due process. Specifically, the case was dismissed
because the State did not provide Mr. Roth with notice, i.e. service of a furlough order that
explained that failure to return would amount to felony escape. The order specifically informed
the Ada County Sheriff that they were to serve a copy of the order on Mr. Roth. Yet, the
evidence shows that the order was not served on Mr. Roth.

The district court found that

dismissal both served the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's business.
Mr. Roth asserts that the district court's ruling was an appropriate use of discretion and the
dismissal should be affirmed on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its

discretion: Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Mr. Roth's Case Due To The State's Failure To
Comply With A District Court Order
Mr. Roth asserts that the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion when it

dismissed his case. He maintains that the State's failure to provide proper service or proof of
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service of the furlough order resulted in a lack of notice regarding the legal ramifications of
failing to return from the furlough, as required in the court order. This lack of notice amounted
to a violation of due process and required dismissal in the interest of justice. Additionally, he
asserts that failing to dismiss would excuse the Ada County Sheriff from complying with court
orders and would hinder the effective administration of the court's business. As such, dismissal
for this reason was also proper.

1.

Idaho Criminal Rule 48 Allows For Dismissal

Idaho Criminal Rule 48 provides in relevant part that:
(a) Dismissal on Motion and Notice. The court, on notice to all parties, may
dismiss a criminal action on its own motion or on motion of any party on either of
the following grounds:

(2) for any other reason if the court concludes that dismissal will serve the
ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's business.
(b) Order of Dismissal. When a court dismisses a criminal action, the order of
dismissal must state the court's reasons for dismissal. ...
Similarly, I.C. § 19-3504 also provides for dismissal:
The court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the
prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action or
indictment to be dismissed. The reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in
an order entered upon the minutes.
Neither LC.R. 48 nor LC. § 19-3504 limit when a court can dismiss a case. The only
express limitations are that the dismissal be in the furtherance or ends of justice, serve the
effective administration of the court's business, and that the reason for the dismissal be
articulated by the court. I.C.R. 48(a)(2)-(b); LC. § 19-3504. Mr. Roth's case was dismissed
following a jury verdict, but prior to sentencing, a time period in which the district court
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maintained jurisdiction. As such, dismissal was an appropriate option for the district court at
the time it dismissed Mr. Roth's case.

2.

The Dismissal Was Proper As It Served The Ends Of Justice

In order to understand the notice issue and why the district court determined that
dismissal was required to satisfy due process and serve the ends of justice the facts of the case,
the relevant code section, and the pattern jury instruction must be examined closely.
In 2011, Mr. Roth was in the Ada County Jail as the result of an allegation that he had
violated the terms of his probation. (R., p.43, State's Exs. 2-3.) At his probation violation
arraignment hearing, Mr. Roth's counsel requested that his client be allowed a bond reduction so
that he could return to Boise State University and plead with the university to change his grades
from "Fs" to "Ws" in an attempt to salvage his GPA and have an opportunity to reenroll in the
future. (Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1, 9:18:40 - 9:19:15, 9:23:00 - 9:28:10.) His request for a
bond reduction was denied. (Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1, 9:30:54 - 9:31 :05) However, the
district court volunteered a one day furlough to allow Mr. Roth to go to Boise State University
and try to change his grades. 4 (Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1, 9:30:29 - 9:30:53.) It was made
clear at the hearing that Mr. Roth was to return no later than 6:00 p.m. on the day he was
released. (Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1, 9:31 :20 - 9:32:35.) However, there was no discussion
regarding the consequences of failing to return. (See generally Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1.) On

4

The State has asserted that Mr. Roth requested the furlough. (App. Br., p.15.) Mr. Roth did not
request a furlough, but a bond reduction. (Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1, 9:23:00 - 9:28:10.) The
furlough was suggested by the district court. (Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1, 9:30:29 - 9:30:53.)
7

December 22, 2011, Mr. Roth was released from the Ada County Jail. 5

(State's Ex. 3.)

Presumably, he did not return as instructed. (State's Ex. 4.)
In November of 2017, Mr. Roth was arrested pursuant to a warrant. (State's Ex. 5.) He
was then charged with escape under LC. § 18-2505. LC. § 18-2505(1) states:
Every prisoner charged with, convicted of, or on probation for a felony who is
confined in any correctional facility, as defined in section 18-l0lA, Idaho
Code, including any private correctional facility, or who while outside the
walls of such correctional facility in the proper custody of any officer or
person, or while in any factory, farm or other place without the walls of such
correctional facility, who escapes or attempts to escape from such officer or
person, or from such correctional facility, or from such factory, farm or other
place without the walls of such correctional facility, shall be guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction thereof, any such second term of imprisonment shall
commence at the time he would otherwise have been discharged. Escape shall
be deemed to include abandonment of a job site or work assignment without
the permission of an employment supervisor or officer. Escape includes the
intentional act of leaving the area of restriction set forth in a court order
admitting a person to bail or release on a person's own recognizance with
electronic or global positioning system tracking or monitoring, or the area of
restriction set forth in a sentencing order, except for leaving the area of
restriction for the purpose of obtaining emergency medical care. A person may
not be charged with the crime of escape for leaving the aforementioned area of
restriction unless the person was notified in writing by the court at the time of
setting of bail, release or sentencing of the consequences of violating this
section by intentionally leaving the area of restriction.
Specifically, the State charged Mr. Roth as follows:
That the Defendant, AARON ARTHUR RYAN ROTH, on or about the 22 nd day
of December, 2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, while convicted of a
Felony and while confined in the Ada County Jail, but temporarily on furlough
outside the walls of the Ada County Jail, did escape to-wit: Defendant failed to
return himself to the Ada County Jail at the conclusion of the ordered furlough
time at 6 p.m., December 22, 2011 as ordered in case number CR-FE-2009-2297
and while having notice that to do so would constitute an escape.

5

In the Appellant's Brief, the State suggests that it was "unlikely" that Mr. Roth went to Boise
State University to change his grades. (App. Br., p.3, n.3.) There is no information in the
Record or transcripts regarding what Mr. Roth did or did not do during his furlough. As such, it
is wholly improper for the State to make such an incendiary assumption.
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(R., p.28.) Notably, the State specifically articulated in the Information that Mr. Roth was being
charged for failing to return from a furlough "while having notice that to do so would constitute
an escape." (R., 28.)
During trial, the State presented the testimony of two witnesses. Deputy Cory Brooks
testified generally about the Ada County Jail's process for furloughs, explained the related
paperwork, and provided evidence that Mr. Roth had not returned as required. (Tr., p.57, L.12 p.89, L.3.) Deputy Brooks also testified that he could not be sure, based on the State's Exhibits
whether Mr. Roth was provided a copy of the temporary release from or the furlough paper
work. (Tr., p.99, Ls.1-7.) Deputy D.J. Rupert, the officer that completed the temporary release
from allowing for Mr. Roth's release, acknowledged that the form was filled out incorrectly and
admitted that there was no signature on the line where the inmate should have signed. (Tr., p.99,
L.19 - p.105, L.5.) He also noted that he was not sure if Mr. Roth received a copy of the
temporary release from. (Tr., p.106, Ls.17-25.)
The State submitted five exhibits: a copy of Mr. Roth's judgment of conviction for the
underlying felony, the furlough order, the Ada County Sheriffs Office Ada County Jail
Temporary Release Form, a record of Mr. Roth's movements within the jail, and a booking
summary showing that Mr. Roth had been arrested in 2017. (State's Exs. 1-5.) State's Exhibit 2,
the furlough order, notes that it must be served upon Mr. Roth and provided a detailed escape
advisory.

(State's Ex. 2.) However, the order does not contain a certificate of service and

provides no insight into the service of the order. (State's Ex. 2.) Further, State's Exhibit 3, the
temporary release form, does not contain a signature on the "Inmate Signature" line where an
inmate agrees to return and appears to indicate that Deputy Rupert was taking responsibility for
returning the inmate. (State's Ex. 2.)
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The State rested after presenting only the above evidence. (Tr., p.108, L.1.) Immediately
thereafter, defense counsel made a motion for an Idaho Criminal Rule 29 judgment of acquittal
based upon the State’s failure to prove notice. (Tr., p.109, L.7 – p.110, L.16.) The State argued
that it had proven notice beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Tr., p.110, L.18 – p.112, L.7.)

Specifically, the prosecutor noted that “there is evidence and sufficient evidence to go to the jury
for them to make a finding that the defendant – and beyond a reasonable doubt – that the
defendant escaped even after being advised in writing of the consequences of violating the
escape statute.” (Tr., p.111, Ls.13-17.) And, “[s]o again, there’s plenty of evidence upon which
this jury could find that the defendant was notified and that he left despite that notification.”
(Tr., p.112, Ls.5-7.) The prosecution also argued that it had proven that the defendant was
served with a copy of the furlough. (Tr., p.118, Ls.10-16.) In response to the district court’s
statement that “there’s no testimony that he was served with it”, the prosecution responded “[t]he
statute requiring a person be notified in writing at the time [I.C. § 18-2505]; I think that’s again
satisfied by this document.” (Tr., p.120, Ls.17-19.)
The State also appeared to think that notice was required by their repeated references to
the “area of restriction.” “. . . [T]he defendant [left] an area of restriction set forth in a furlough
order and that area of restriction was defined in the furlough order. The defendant was given a
time and manner in which the defendant was to leave the Ada County Jail for the sole purpose of
settling his affairs with the – at Boise State University and then returning by a certain time. And
he left that area of restriction that was specified in that order.” (Tr., p.112, Ls.16-24.)
The area of restriction; the court has noted is Ada County to BSU and back. And
it seems a fair inference the defendant left that area over the course of time, but
there’s no testimony about him having left over the course of those six years.
And I would say that the area of restriction is not only a physical area, but a
temporal one and that is that the defendant had a duty during which he was to go
from the jail to the Boise State University and back. And that he violated the area

10

of restriction as well by simply not returning within the date and time frame on
the document. . . . that's evidence the jury can consider as a violation of the area
of restriction as outlined by the order."
(Tr., p.120, L.20 -p.121, L.12.)
The district court issued its decision the next morning. (Tr., p.125, L.13 - p.130, L.14.)
The district court found that notice was not required under the first clause of LC. § 18-2505,
denied the motion, and removed the notice element from the jury instructions. (Tr., p.127, L.1 p.129, L.8.)

While the language of LC. § 18-2505(1) may be unclear6 , the district court

specifically determined that the first clause did not require notice as it did not involve "an area of
restriction" as is mentioned for those released on bail and with electronic monitoring.
(Tr., p.127, Ls.1-25.) LC. § 18-2505(1) is complemented by two different jury instructions
found in I.C.J.I. 601:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Escape, the state must prove each
of the following:
1. On or about [date]
2. in the state ofldaho
3. the defendant [name] was [charged with] [convicted of] [on probation
for] ( describe felony), a felony,
[4. and while [in proper custody of] [confined in]
5. ( describe institution or officer or person)
6. [escaped] [attempted to escape].]
[or]
[4. intentionally
5. left [the area ofrestriction set forth in a court order admitting a person
to bail or release on a person's own recognizance with electronic or global
positioning system tracking, monitoring and detention] [or] [the area of restriction
set forth in a sentencing order,] except for leaving the area of restriction for the
purpose of obtaining emergency medical care

6

Mr. Roth reserves the right to address his challenges to the statute, the district court's
interpretation of the statute, the denial of the earlier motions to dismiss, sufficiency, the denial of
his motions for judgement of acquittal, and all other properly preserved issues should this case be
remanded, Mr. Roth sentenced, and a new Notice of Appeal filed on Mr. Roth's behalf.
11

6. and had previously been notified in writing by the court at [the time of
setting of [bail], [release]] [or] [sentencing] of the consequences of violating the
escape statute by intentionally leaving the area of restriction.]
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
Based upon its reading of the statue, the district court provided the jury with an instruction,
comporting with the first half of ICJI 601, the portion that did not require notice. (R., p.150.)
However, the district court expressed concerns that “[t]he order also clearly directs the
sheriff to serve the defendant with the written order. I heard no evidence that the defendant was,
in fact, served with the order. It was not signed in the proper location by the defendant. The
evidence is thin at best that the defendant even actually signed the order. Above the area where
it would appear that the defendant did sign the officer wrote, quote, ‘defendant understands’ or
words to that effect. ‘Defendant understands’ is not equivalent to ‘defendant was served’.”
(Tr., p.128, Ls.9-18.)
After denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court noted that its
analysis did not end there, as it was concerned about due process:
The essence of due process of law is notice of conduct that would constitute a
crime, and . . . Judge Greenwood required that the notice be served. In other
words, the order required that the notice be served even if the law does not
specifically require it under the circumstances of this case.
And as previously mentioned, I do believe that there was insufficient
evidence that the order was served by the Ada County Sheriff. . . . I have serious
questions as to whether there is sufficient evidence that a jury might find proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the order was served. Due process of law, as
mentioned, requires notice of conduct that would constitute a crime, and notice
starts with service. And without service, notice is insufficient. Without notice,
there is no due process.
(Tr., p.129, L.8 – p.130, L.4.) The court then noted that it may grant a motion for judgment of
acquittal “in the interest of justice.” (Tr., p.130, Ls.5-10.)

12

Despite the district court’s ruling that notice was not required, the first time the State took
the position that it did not need to prove notice was in closing argument. (Tr., p.185, Ls.2-12.)
Yet, even at this point, the prosecution argued that notice had been proven:
First, is this idea of notice to the defendant. And I put a question mark
after it because I don’t see that in the elements that the State has to prove. . . . So
that is what I would characterize as a side issue. It’s not something that the State
has to respond to to prove. However, the State’s evidence still accomplishes
notice. . . . [Discussion of State’s evidence.] . . . And, so yes, ladies and
gentlemen, the defendant was notified and notice was given to him. It was his
own request and it’s certainly reasonable based on all of the evidence before you
that the defendant was served and notified.
(Tr., p.158, L.2 – p.160, L.22.)
When the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel again renewed his motion for
Rule 29 relief. (Tr., p.174, Ls.4-16.) The motion was again denied. (Tr., p.180, Ls.2-4.)
Nonetheless, the district court continued to be concerned that “while I think that the concept
notice of [sic] is of some importance, part of what struck me in this case is that Judge
Greenwood’s furlough order clearly required the Ada County Sheriff’s Office to serve that order
on the defendant so that there could be no question, no doubt that he was formally, officially and
lawfully notified that if he violated the furlough order, he could be charged with the crime of
escape, which would carry a possible punishment of five years consecutive time in prison . . .”
(Tr., p.179, Ls.8-17.)
A few days later, Mr. Roth filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a
motion to dismiss. (R., pp.166-173.) Mr. Roth asserted that he had not received adequate notice,
such lack of notice resulted in a violation of due process, and that the district court had no
authority to grant a furlough back in 2011. (R., pp.166-173.)
At the hearing on the motion, the State asserted, in stark contrast to its previous
arguments, that “[t]he reason there was no evidence of notice at trial was that that simply wasn’t
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one of the elements the State had to prove or establish.” (Tr. 8/9/18, p.5, Ls.18-20.) The State
also argued that “the defendant himself requested the furlough” and was aware of the parameters
of his release. (Tr. 8/9/18, p.6, L.12 – p.7, L.11.) Defense counsel maintained that Mr. Roth did
not have notice that he could be charged with escape and without notice of the consequence an
individual would assume that failure to return would only result in an additional probation
violation or a finding of contempt of court. (Tr. 8/9/19, p.9, L.7 – p.11, L.16.) He asserted that
dismissal would serve the ends of justice. (Tr. 8/9/19, p.12, Ls.2-8.)
The district court issued an order denying the motion for judgment of acquittal and
granting the motion to dismiss. (R., pp.177-182.) The court acknowledged that while similar
situations require notice be proven, the situation at hand does not, according to I.C. § 18-2505.
(R., p.181.) However, the order for furlough did specifically require that notice be provided to
Mr. Roth and that notice was not provided:
The Furlough Order specifically required that the Ada County sheriff serve a copy
of the Furlough Order on the Defendant. There was insufficient evidence for the
Court to find that it was more likely than not that the Defendant was served with a
copy of the Furlough Order. The Court concludes that he was not. Likewise,
there is insufficient evidence for the Court to find that it was more likely than not
that Defendant was verbally informed of the consequences of violating the
Furlough Order. The Court concludes that he was not.
(R., p.182.) The district court then held that the case must be dismissed in the interest of justice
and for the effective administration of court business:
It violates fundamental notions of justice and fairness to allow the instant
conviction to stand under these facts and circumstances, i.e. the Ada County
failed to follow the court order.
This case must be dismissed because the effective administration of the Court’s
business requires that court orders be served on those who are affected by them,
especially when the order itself specifically requires such service. Dismissal in
this case also serves the ends of justice, because the Defendant was not given
notice of the consequences of violating the Furlough Order, the same order which
required that notice be given to him.
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(R., p.182.)
Approximately a week later, the State filed a motion to reconsider. (R., pp.186-191.)
The State claimed that the case was dismissed without authority, that proof of notice was not
required, and that even if notice was "a relevant consideration for [the] Court" Mr. Roth received
the notice he was due. (R., pp.186-191.) The district court denied the motion. 7 (R., pp.215221.)

Specifically, the district court found that it had authority under I.C.R. 48 to enter a

dismissal, that there was no evidence that Mr. Roth had received proper service and notice in
accordance with the district court's order, and, as such, dismissal was proper. (R., pp.218-220.)
The district court noted:
The Court found and continues to find that although there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to find the Defendant guilty of escape as set forth by the statute and jury
instructions, allowing the conviction to stand violates fundamental notions of
justice and fairness. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that this
dismissal is necessary to impress upon a sheriff the importance of serving court
orders and properly documenting that such court orders are in fact served. To
hold otherwise would excuse a sheriff from complying with court orders which
hinders the effective administration of court business and the ends of justice.
Moreover, the Defendant will still "face the music" before Judge Greenwood in
the underlying case on the probation violation charge of absconding.
Accordingly, the Court found and continues to find that dismissal in this case will
serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's business
under Rule 48(a)(2).
(R., pp.220-221.)
It is unquestionable, based upon the Information filed and the original arguments of the

prosecutor, that up until the State's rested its case, the State not only believed that it had to prove
notice (R., p.28), but also believed that it had the opportunity to do so, and had done just that

7

In the Appellant's Brief, the State has presented no challenge to the district court's denial of the
motion to reconsider. (See generally App. Br.) Thus, it has waived its right to present this issue
on appeal.
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(Tr., p.110, L.18 – p.112, L.7; p.118, Ls.10-16; p.120, Ls.17-19). Later claiming that it was not
required to prove notice and then arguing that placing such a requirement on the State created “a
moving target for the State” (R., p.189) or “left the state in a Kafkaesque bind” (App. Brief,
p.12) are disingenuous. Instead, Mr. Roth asserts that the State has unclean hands and, as such,
the dismissal should be affirmed.
Despite the State’s positional shifts, the district court did not require the State to prove
notice for the purposes of establishing guilt. The district court let the case go to the jury with an
escape instruction that did not include notice. (R., p.150.) It repeatedly denied motions for
judgment of acquittal because notice was not an element of the crime. (Tr., p.127, L.1 – p.129,
L.8; p.180, Ls.2-4; R., pp.177-182.) To the extent that the State is asserting that Mr. Roth’s case
was dismissed because the State failed to prove notice as an element of the offense of escape,
that claim is not factually supported.
Instead, the court correctly dismissed Mr. Roth’s case because he had not been properly
served and, as result, not properly notified of the criminal consequences for failing to return from
his furlough, i.e. that his right to due process had been violated. Defense counsel and the district
court became aware of the lack of notice after the State provided evidence proving that Mr. Roth
was not served with the furlough order. As the court noted “[t]here was insufficient evidence for
the Court to find that it was more likely than not that the Defendant was served with a copy of
the Furlough Order. The Court concludes that he was not.” (R., p.182 (emphasis added.) This
evidence, presented by the State for the purpose of proving notice, as noted by prosecutor during
the trial, alerted the district court to a serious due process violation. It was a concern that the
district court could not shake and mentioned each time it denied the motions for judgment of
acquittal. (Tr., p.128, Ls.9-18; p.129, L.8 – p.130, L.10; p.179, Ls.8-17; R., p.182.)

16

A failure on the part of the government to inform individuals of what conduct is criminal
and of the resulting consequences is a clear violation of due process. The Due Process Clauses
of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution forbid the State from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §

1; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. Due process requires the State to provide "notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before the government takes a person's property or
liberty interest. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover

Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313 (1950)).
Normally, ignorance of the law is not a defense. State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 356 (Ct.
App. 2006).

However, this customarily assumes that the criminal behavior is codified,

published, and available to the citizenry, as is most criminal conduct in the State ofldaho. Yet,
unlike a prisoner that is furloughed by the Idaho Department of Correction 8, no criminal
defendant furloughed by the district court can have knowledge of the limits of the furlough or the
related criminal consequences without either an explanation in court or receiving a written order.
This situation is not unique, but similar to numerous other circumstances. For example, without
service of jury summons, a juror does not know that they must appear in court. A parent may not
know that they will face a contempt charge for failing to return their child to the other parent
without the service of the custody orders. Or, more simply, a person may not know they have
violated the speed limit if the speed limit sign has been removed. In each of these circumstances,
notice is required to satisfy due process. Likewise, in the case at hand, failure to receive notice,

8

Furloughs from the Idaho Department of Corrections are codified in LC. §§ 20-l0lC and 20242 and provide that failure to return will result in a charge under LC.§ 18-2505. It appears that
the Idaho Code does not contemplate furloughs granted by the district court.
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when it was deemed necessary in the district court's furlough order, must be a violation of due
process regardless of whether notice is an element of the statutory offense of escape.
Therefore, the district court was correct in finding that "[i]t violates fundamental notions
of justice and fairness to allow the instant conviction to stand under these facts and
circumstances, i.e. [that] Ada County failed to follow the court order." (R., p.182.) Mr. Roth
asserts that the dismissal should be affirmed as it serves the ends of justice.
Additionally, Mr. Roth asserts the district court also correctly granted dismissal to
impress upon the Sheriff the importance of complying with court orders.

3.

The Dismissal Was Proper As It Served The Effective Administration Of The
Court's Business

The second reason provided for the dismissal of Mr. Roth's case was the need to impress
upon the Ada County Sheriff the importance and need for court orders to "be served upon those
who are affected by them, especially when the order itself specifically requires such service."
(R., p.182.)

The district court noted that the court cannot effectively administer the court's

business without the State's compliance with its orders. (R., p.182.) This was reiterated in the
Order Denying State's Motion to Reconsider where the court noted dismissal was necessary both
to confirm the importance of service, but also the importance of documentation of service.
(R., p.220.) Although the State has loosely asserted that dismissing Mr. Roth's case does not

serve the effective administration of the court's business (App. Brief, p.12), it does not offer any
argument as to the district court's concerns about how the State's failure to comply with a district
court order or failure to properly document possible compliance may affect court business.
Logically, the State is bound by court orders and its failure to comply must significantly
influence the effective administration of the court's business. As such, Mr. Roth asserts that
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dismissal was also proper for this purpose.

Additionally, he maintains that in light of his

constitutional right to due process, as discussed above, it would be fundamentally unfair to
punish him for allegedly failing to comply with the district court's furlough order and allow the
State reap the benefit of a conviction when it, as the district court found, the State did not
comply.

4.

Although This Case's Dismissal Will Prohibit Refiling, The Result Is Just

I.C.R 48(c) notes that "[a]n order for dismissal is not a bar if the offense is a felony."
Despite the language of !.C.R. 48, the State is likely barred from retrying Mr. Roth's case due to
double jeopardy protections.

The prohibition against double jeopardy encompasses both

multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho
775, 778 (1999). Double jeopardy protection is triggered by the attachment of jeopardy. Id.
(citing Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1978)). Thus, the dismissal in Mr. Roth's case is
equivalent to a dismissal with prejudice.
However, contrary to the State's assertions otherwise, this is not an unjust result. (App.
Br., p.13.) Occasionally, the underlying reason for the dismissal of a felony cannot be cured and,
therefore, the charge cannot later be refiled. Mr. Roth's case presents such a scenario. Even if
the State were allowed to pursue the escape charge, they would never be able to satisfy the due
process notice requirement. It is impossible for the State to go back in time and properly serve
Mr. Roth with the furlough order. As such, regardless of whether jeopardy had attached, the
State should not have been allowed to pursue the escape charge in the future.
Further, to the extent that the State asserts that it was denied the opportunity to prove that
it had met the due process notice requirements, this argument is erroneous. As discussed above,
the State clearly believed that it had to prove notice as an element of the offence when it
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presented its case to the jury. (R., p.128; Tr., p.110, L.18 - p.112, L.7; p.118, Ls.10-16; p.120,
Ls.17-19). As such, the State has already had an opportunity to prove notice during trial. Since
that time, the State has had two additional opportunities to prove that it complied with due
process, at the hearing for the motion to dismiss and in the State's motion to reconsider. The
State failed to provide any additional evidence to support its position at either opportunity. In
fact, the only additional evidence provided was an audio recording of the probation violation
arraignment. The audio proves that Mr. Roth was not told, during the hearing, that his failure to
return could be charged as escape. (See generally Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1.) Thus, the State
was unable to prove either that the order was served or that Mr. Roth was verbally informed of
the consequences of failing to return. Certainly, if any evidence existed that could prove that
Mr. Roth was served with the order or advised of the consequences the State would have either
produced it at trial, a trial they had over seven months to prepare for, or during either of the posttrial opportunities. There is simply no reason to believe that there is any additional evidence that
could prove that the State provided the constitutionally mandated due process.
Additionally, depriving the State of its opportunity to again pursue the escape charge
does not limit their ability to hold Mr. Roth accountable for his alleged actions. If, as the State
has asserted, Mr. Roth did not return from his furlough, the State can file a probation violation
for absconding or failing to comply with a lawful order.

5.

Contrary To The State's Assertions Otherwise, Mr. Roth Did Not Receive
"Abundant Notice"

The State has asserted that "[t]he record reveals that Roth had abundant notice of the
furlough." (App. Br., p.14.) However, the State's argument misinterprets the district court's
ruling.

The notice the district court and Mr. Roth were concerned with was notice of the
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consequences of failing to return from the furlough, i.e. that Mr. Roth could be charged with
escape, not the time or location limitations of the furlough. Mr. Roth acknowledges that he was
present at the hearing where the limitations of the furlough were explained to him. 9

(See

generally Motion to Reconsider Ex. 1.) As noted in detail above, there is insufficient evidence to
prove that Mr. Roth was served with the furlough order or verbally informed of the consequences
of failing to return.
The State's argument that the temporary release from was "signed and dated by 'Aaron
Roth,' next to a handwritten notation of 'INMATE UNDERSTANDING,"' assumes facts that
are not in evidence. (App. Br., p.15.) There was no evidence presented that Mr. Roth was the
person who wrote his name on the form. (See generally Tr.) The purported signature was not on
a line where the inmate was supposed to sign and, as such, one cannot merely assume that it was
his signature. (State's Ex. 3.) Further, even if Mr. Roth printed his name on the form, it does not
prove that he was served with the furlough order or that he was informed of the consequences of
failing to return. After all, the district court specifically found that this evidence was insufficient
to prove that Mr. Roth was served: "[t ]here was insufficient evidence for the Court to find that it
was more likely than not that the Defendant was served with a copy of the Furlough Order. The

Court concludes that he was not." (R., p.182 (emphasis added).)
The State has also asserted that because the furlough order was drafted by defense
counsel Mr. Roth must be aware of the contents.

(App. Br., p.15.)

Mr. Roth was not

representing himself He did not draft the order. There is no certificate of service showing that

9

It would not be unreasonable for any defendant granted a furlough and not informed of the
potential escape charges to assume that failing to return would result in a contempt charge for
violating a court order or a probation violation, if the defendant was serving a probationary term,
instead of a felony escape charge.
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defense counsel served a copy of the order upon Mr. Roth. (State's Ex. 3.) Similarly, there is no
evidence that counsel verbally advised Mr. Roth of the contents of the order. As such, the fact
that the order was drafted by defense counsel also provides no evidence that Mr. Roth was
served with the furlough order or that he was informed of the consequences of failing to return.
Finally, in misinterpreting Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993) 10 , the
State has asserted that those who escape have no right to litigate their case and that Mr. Roth is
not entitled to an "equitable boon that unwinds the jury verdict." (App. Br., pp.16-17.) The
State appears to assert that those charged with escape have somehow waived or are underserving
of their constitutional rights. Ortega-Rodriguez in no way limits that the State's constitutional
obligation to provide a defendant with due process oflaw. The successful assertion of a right to
due process and the district court's dismissal of a case due to the State's failure to comply with
the Constitution is in no way a "boon" for any defendant.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Roth respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court's Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.C.R. 48(a)(2).
DATED this 13 th day of August, 2019.

/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

10

Ortega-Rodreguez holds that where defendant's flight and recapture occurred before appeal,
the former fugitive status did not necessarily have the required connection to the appellate
process which would justify an appellate sanction of dismissal. Ortega-Rodreguez, 507 U.S. at
252.
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